Authors

  • Julian Savulescu
    Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics Director, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Mark Sheehan
    James Martin Research Fellow, Program on the Ethics of the New Biosciences, University of Oxford
  • Peter Taylor
    Research Associate, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford
  • Anders Sandberg
    James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford
  • Guy Kahane
    Deputy Director, Oxford Uehrio Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Toby Ord
    Research Associate, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Dominic Wilkinson
    DPhil Student, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Rebecca Roache
    James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford
  • S. Matthew Liao
    Deputy Director, and James Martin Senior Research Fellow, Program on the Ethics of the New Biosciences, University of Oxford
  • Steve Clarke
    James Martin Research Fellow, Program on the Ethics of the New Biosciences, University of Oxford
  • Neil Levy
    James Martin Research Fellow, Program on the Ethics of the New Biosciences, University of Oxford
  • Tom Douglas
    DPhil Student, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Rafaela Hillerbrand
    James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford
  • Luciano Floridi
    Research Chair in Philosophy of Information, Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire and Fellow of St Cross College, University of Oxford
  • Janet Radcliffe Richards
    Distinguished Research Fellow, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Nick Bostrom
    Director, Oxford Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford
  • Lachlan de Crespigny
    Principal Fellow, Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, University of Melbourne; Honorary Fellow, Murdoch Children's Research Institute; Research Associate, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics
  • Roger Crisp
    Uehiro Fellow, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Barbro Fröding nee Bjorkman
    Marie Curie Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Francesca Minerva
    Visiting Student, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • David Edmonds
    Research Associate, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Pablo Stafforini
    DPhil Student, Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford
  • Alexandre Erler
    Dphil Student, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
  • Russell Powell
    Research Fellow, Science and Religious Conflict, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford

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Decision Making

July 10, 2009

Is it Worth Living Longer?

Research recently published in Nature suggests that the drug rapamycin may have the potential to extend human life span by decades: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8139816.stm

If the life is of ‘positive’ value, it might seem obvious that the drug is worth taking. But not everyone would agree. The Hellenistic philosopher Epicurus famously argued that, since it marks the end of conscious life, ‘death nothing to us’. Fearing death makes as much sense as regretting you weren’t around for all that time before your birth.

Continue reading "Is it Worth Living Longer?" »

June 09, 2009

Decisions, decisions.

I’ve just returned from Malta where I came across a story that I had missed at the time.  A decade ago a Catholic woman from the Maltese island of Gozo gave birth to conjoined twins.  Doctors said the twins would both die unless they were operated on; but if this operation went ahead only one of the babies would survive.

Continue reading "Decisions, decisions." »

March 27, 2009

Overruling parents and allowing infants to die

Over the weekend a nine-month old infant, baby ‘OT’, died following a court ruling that allowed doctors to remove life support. As discussed in a post last week, his parents had wanted treatment to continue, but the court ruled that the hospital could withdraw the breathing machine that was keeping OT alive and allow him to die.

Continue reading "Overruling parents and allowing infants to die" »

February 27, 2009

Is doodling a form of cheating?

The public often complains about the fluctuating and conflicting attitudes of scientists.  So often do things heralded as good for us one week turn out to be deadly the next (consider, for example, this recent report about vitamin pills) that there seems little point in trying to follow the advice of scientists.  

Some recent news stories raise the question of whether the public is inclined to dismiss the conflicting views of ethicists, too.  Ethical concerns about pharmacological cognitive enhancement have regularly been reported in the press (see, for example, here, here, and here); whilst at the same time—as Dominic Wilkinson has noted on this blog—the public has embraced non-pharmacological cognitive enhancement in the form of software designed to improve brain power, and the media currently abounds with docile, non-panicky reports of how instant messaging, texting, taking short naps, taking long naps, listening to The Beatles, and doodling can all enhance cognition in various ways.  So far, there have been no reports of ethical concerns about these activities: nobody is suggesting that students who doodle during lectures are cheating.  It seems that, despite the concerns of some, the public is willing to embrace cognitive enhancement in a variety of forms.

Continue reading "Is doodling a form of cheating?" »

February 11, 2009

Transparent brains: detecting preferences with infrared light

Researchers at University of Toronto have demonstrated that they can decode which of two drinks a test subject prefers by scanning their brains with infrared light. (Original paper here.) The intention is to develop better brain-computer interfaces for severely disabled people, but there are obvious other applications for non-invasive methods of detecting what people want. No doubt neuromarketers are drooling over the applications. But the threat to mental privacy might be a smaller problem than the threat of mistaken preferences.

Continue reading "Transparent brains: detecting preferences with infrared light" »

December 16, 2008

Tattoos and taboos: making end of life preferences known when it matters

A 79 year old euthanasia campaigner in New Zealand has attracted local and international publicity after having the words ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ tattooed across her chest. Although this seems unlikely to be widely emulated her action highlights the problem that at the time when it might be most important to make one’s views known, patients are often unconscious or incompetent.

Continue reading "Tattoos and taboos: making end of life preferences known when it matters" »

December 15, 2008

Climate Change, Abortion, and Impersonality

We are surrounded by many ethical issues, and their complexity makes it tempting to treat each in isolation. But we need to remember that to justify any position requires reference to universal principles, and these principles may well have implications in other areas we find uncomfortable. It’s also the case that thinking about one topic can provide helpful angles on others.

Consider first climate change. European leaders have just announced a climate change pact (http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/dec/13/carbon-emissions-eu). One central concern of those advocating measures to slow down and ultimately stop climate change is the well-being of future generations. But, as Derek Parfit brought out especially clearly in his classic Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, ch. 16), we have here a ‘non-identity problem’. Imagine that we allow the climate to change to the point that conditions on earth are significantly less conducive to human habitation than now. It might seem that future generations would be able to complain about our actions now. But in fact these individuals will exist only because of those actions. If we’d adopted different policies, then different individuals would have been born. The only complaint the future individuals might have would be if we had created conditions such that the value of their lives to them was lower than a life of no value at all – that is, a life which would have been better had it ended just as soon as it began. And even that doesn’t seem such a serious wrong, if the future individuals have the opportunity to end their lives in some not too painful a way.

But surely there is something wrong with damaging the environment so that the value of lives lived is much lower than that of lives that might have been lived? This suggests that an important element in ethics is impersonal. By harming the environment, we are doing something very wrong. But we are not wronging any particular persons. Our wrong consists in making the world – in terms of the quality of lives lived within it, independently of exactly who lives those lives – worse than it might have been.

Now consider abortion, which is condemned in the latest Instruction from the Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dignitas Personae: http://www.usccb.org/comm/Dignitaspersonae/Dignitas_Personae.pdf  . The official Catholic view here is that a fetus, because it is a human being (which of course it is – a human being at the fetal stage), has the same dignity and moral status as any other human being. So abortion is on the same moral level as the murder of a child.

A common liberal view in our society is that abortion is entirely morally acceptable, while the murder of a child is very wrong. Here the liberal faces a serious problem which the Catholic does not: where to draw the line between a fetal human being and a young child at which moral status emerges. Liberals often claim that moral status develops gradually, but there is something unsatisfactory about this. What seems to make the murder of a young child wrong, as regards the child itself, is that it deprives the child of the rest of its life. But that is true of abortion. Indeed a murdered child may have had at least some valuable life before it is killed.

Ethical impersonality provides a way for liberals about abortion both to accept the Catholic view on moral status and to allow abortion while forbidding the murder of post-birth human beings. The moral wrong done to a fetus through abortion is indeed on roughly the same level as that done to a murdered post-birth human being. But it is very hard to say, from the impersonal point of view, whether either abortion or murder is wrong. We do not know what the optimum population level at any time is, so whether cutting short any particular life is, in itself, good or bad is unclear. But the effect of a murder on the overall level of well-being in the world is significantly greater than that of an abortion. Not only does it cause painful grief among relatives and friends of the murdered, but it increases fear and a sense of insecurity among many people. Murder on a large scale can even make life intolerable for just about everyone concerned, as recent events in the Congo have illustrated.

December 03, 2008

The root cause

On April 16 2007  a solitary gunman, Cho Seung-Hui, killed 32 of his fellow students at Virginia Tech, and injured many more http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/04/18/vtech.shooting/index.html .  This came to mind again as I was listening to Radio 4’s Any Questions last Friday, when a questioner referring to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai asked whether we could ever put a stop to extremist violence.  In the subsequent debate difference of opinion began to appear between the panellists who spoke about the need for security and intelligence gathering and military operation, and Caroline Lucas of the Green Party who insisted that terrorism could never be ended by these means, and said several times that we needed to get to the root cause of the problem.  In starting to identify these root causes she mentioned the Palestinian situation, and the widespread feeling among Muslims that the so-called war on terror was really a war of the West against Islam.  (You can check the detail by going to the BBC i-player: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/ .)

Continue reading "The root cause" »

November 18, 2008

Status quo bias and presumed consent for organ donation

Yesterday the UK organ donation taskforce released its report on a presumed consent (opt-out) system for organ donation. To the consternation of the chief medical officer and the Prime Minister the taskforce advised against the introduction into the UK of such a system.

In an editorial in today’s Guardian, it was observed that both the low rates of consent in the UK – and the taskforce’s response to the question of presumed consent may represent an irrational preference for the default position. They may both be examples of the status quo bias.

Continue reading "Status quo bias and presumed consent for organ donation" »

November 14, 2008

Teenagers and the right to be wrong

A teenager who is a Jehovah’s witness declines a potentially life-saving blood transfusion. Another teenager, self-conscious and strongly believing that it will make her happier, requests a boob job.
When minors make decisions that may be against their own best interests, should we respect their decisions?

Continue reading "Teenagers and the right to be wrong " »

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